ABSTRACT Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent stealthy, powerful, long-term, and well-funded attacks against cyber systems, such as data centers and cloud storage. Evolutionary game theory is used to capture the long-term continuous behavior of the APTs on the cloud storage devices. Two APT defense games with discrete strategies are formulated, in which both an APT attacker and a defender compete to control one or multiple storage devices regarding their attack or defense intervals. The dynamical stability of each defense and attack strategy pair is studied according to the replicator dynamics criteria to characterize the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium strategies. The evolutionary stable strategy is discussed in each game, which is a subset of the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (NE). The phase portraits provide the locally asymptotically stable points of the APT defense game, which represent the NE showing the relationship between the asymptotic stability and evolutionary stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous targeting of storage devices by a well funded, powerful attacker are called Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) [1] . A study of APT in [2] shows that an attacker can apply advanced attack techniques such as spear phishing and watering-hole-attacks against cyber systems such as cloud storage and servers. The nature of these attacks reflects deep conflicts among many factors such as the attacker's desire to control the system versus the attacking cost. Attackers can also use social engineering to pretend to be trustworthy. As a result, game theory has been used in [3] to model the conflict between an APT attacker and the defender.
In this paper, we study the dynamics of the APT defense of cloud storage regarding the APT attack and scan intervals, according to the replicator dynamics (RD). Evolutionary game theory [4] - [7] and the replicator dynamics, together, provide a dynamic picture of the APT defense over a finite set of time intervals. This study can help understand the APT attacks against smart facilities such as in a smart city, medical devices, and Internet of Things. Specifically, we consider two asymmetric evolutionary games, in which the APT attacker and the defender can learn the optimal strategy by using the RD criteria. Under RD, players compare their payoffs using a certain strategy with the average payoff gained in their population, and choose the strategy which gives them the higher than average payoff.
In the APT defense game one or multiple storage devices or data centers are threatened by an APT attacker who can choose the attack intervals, i.e., the time periods before launching APT, while the defender chooses the waiting periods before scanning the devices. The importance of each storage device to the attacker and the defender, such as the size of the stored data and their priority is described by the attack cost and the defense gain. In addition, by further testing the locally asymptotically stable points of the RD, which are the stable Nash equilibrium (NE) solutions for the APT defense game, we study the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the APT defense game. The phase portrait is presented to show dynamic games, and help one to understand the conditions under which a specific strategy will be played and if that strategy is going to withstand some small perturbations in the players' attitudes to replace it. The best defense strategy against APT is analyzed under various APT attack and defend models, such as the intervals required to successfully launch attacks against a given storage device. A systematic RD-based procedure is derived to solve the evolutionary game of APT defense.
Most existing game theoretic studies on APT such as [3] , [8] , and [9] focus on modeling the attack behavior and assume that both the attacker and the defender reach a solution to their conflict through the Nash equilibrium, which represents the stable state of the system. However, the NE in an evolutionary game is not always the ultimate solution or even asymptotically stable. Therefore, we apply ESS to investigate whether the NE of the proposed APT defense game is resilient to small perturbations. The main contribution of this work is characterized by the following: (1) We formulate an APT defense game using evolutionary game theory to study the dynamic behavior of the APT attacker and defender with replicator dynamics. (2) The stability and the robust solutions of the APT defense game are studied according to the ESS criteria. (3) We indicate the conditions under which the APT defense game has the ESS for given initial conditions, and depict them pictorially.
The paper is organized as follows: related work is reviewed in Section II. Section III provides the evolutionary game model. Section IV presents the ESS of the dynamic APT defense game. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Evolutionary game theory has been used to study the dynamics of many competing scenarios. For example, in wireless networks, users compete for network resources [10] - [15] . In [10] , two evolutionary games used to model multiple access control in a slotted Aloha wireless network and power control for a wide band CDMA system are presented. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESS's) for the games are studied under different wireless channels and pricing schemes. A user-base station association study using evolutionary games is presented in [11] . In [12] , evolutionary games are used to study distributed resource allocation in small cells. Potential games and evolutionary dynamics are used to address the noncooperative routing problem in [13] . Coexistence in cognitive radio where the available channels have different qualities and the associated user behavior in channel selection is modeled as an evolutionary game in [14] , and the ESS for the corresponding symmetric game is derived. A pricing evolutionary game between users and video streaming service providers is studied in [15] .
Evolutionary games have been used in modeling security conflicts as in [16] , [17] , and [18] . The work in [16] addresses the secrecy rate adaptation between a sensor node and its responsible cluster head as an evolutionary game to solve the conflict between increasing the secrecy rate, and minimizing the cost for data transmission in a wireless sensor network. In [17] , an indirect reciprocity-based security system for large-scale wireless networks is presented where malicious users are punished by building a reputation system. The jamming evolutionary game as presented in [18] , uses cooperation between users to defend against cooperative jammers, and finds the ESS under different channels and power cost conditions. A recent survey on evolutionary game applications is presented in [19] , where the authors considered specific engineering applications based on evolutionary games, such as building dynamic dispatch algorithms in smart grids.
Since the seminal work in [3] proposed the game theoretic formulation of the APT problem, other studies have followed. For example, the APT defense game with a resource constraint environment as presented in [8] analyzes two games. A dynamic game proposed in [20] studies the interactions between the defender and the attacker, while the insiders were competing among themselves to sell the information to the attacker at the risk of being caught by the defender. A three-player game model as presented in [9] , investigates the interactions among an APT attacker, a cyber system defender, and insiders. The prospect theoretic study on APT defense in [21] discloses the impact of the subjective view of an APT attacker on the data safety levels of a cloud storage. In this paper, we formulate an asymmetric evolutionary game between the APT attacker and the cloud storage defender to find the evolutionary stable strategies in the APT defense games.
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAME OF APT DEFENSE GAME
Evolutionary APT games are dynamic games in which the attacker and the defender apply learning rules in multiple (attack and defense) time-intervals. The resulting equilibrium (if any) is called ESS, which is an NE, but the reverse is not necessarily true. According to [5] , the evolutionary games with mixed strategies and asymmetric payoffs do not have an ESS under the RD. A population contains the players of the same interests, and apply the same strategies. Each player has a set of pure strategies E i , i = 1, . . . , n. Each player chooses each of the n strategies with a probability p i . It is well known that each mixed-strategy game has an NE [22] . The probability vector p has the usual probability properties, i.e, p i ≥ 0 and n i=1 p i = 1. As a result, a strategy corresponds to a point p in S n . Assume that the players in the population were playing one of two pure strategies, E 1 and E 2 , according to probability vectors p and q. A population that uses the strategy E 1 is said to be evolutionary stable, if when a small part ( ) of it switches to the strategy E 2 , the strategy E 1 keeps giving its players higher payoff. In equations, let the payoff function for each player be denoted as u(E 1 , E 1 ), then the strategy E 1 is an ESS (will resist the mutant or invading strategy E 2 ) if
for all sufficiently small . The conditions under which the ESS exists are given by the following: Theorem 1 [6] : For a population , where each player has a set of n pure strategies E i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the mixed strategies p and q in the game with an associated payoff matrix A. The strategy p ∈ S n is an ESS if and only if:
for all p = q ∈ S n . Theorem 2 [6] : The ESS for two populations and with pure strategies E i , i = 1, . . . , n, and F j , j = 1, . . . , m, with payoff matrices A and B respectively, is the strategy (p * , q * ) where p * ∈ S n and q * ∈ S m that satisfies: p * T Aq * > p T Aq * , for all p ∈ S n and p = p * , and, q * T Bp * > q T Bp * , for all q ∈ S m and q = q * , where p and q are the probability vectors over the pure strategies of the two populations and , respectively.
We emphasize the fact that the ESS in Theorem 2 is a set of pure strategies under the Replicator Dynamic (RD). The RD is a nonlinear differential equation that captures the evolution of the users' preference toward using a certain pure strategy, and has a wide range of applications because of its simplicity and practicality. The RD for one population evolutionary game is given as:
where the initial conditions are p i (0) = p i,0 over all possible strategies. The differential equation (3) says that at any time, the number of users (the user strategy preference) who are using strategy p i can increase or decrease by comparing the payoff to the average payoff given in formula (4).
A. THE RELATION BETWEEN ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY AND EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY
Any asymptotically stable strategy (point) is a NE, but the reverse does not hold in general. Any ESS is a NE, and the reverse does not hold in general. More importantly, asymptotic stability does not guarantee evolutionary stability (see for example the game proposed by Zeeman [23] , and mentioned in [5] ). If we have one population with each player has a symmetric payoff function and the payoff matrix is symmetric, the asymptotic stability implies evolutionary stability [5] . In asymmetric two population game with two strategies for each player, the asymptotic stability also implies evolutionary stability [7] . The ESS is more stable than the local asymptotic stability, and thus a Zeeman's game shows that the region of attraction of the ESS is larger than that of the regular attractor (asymptotically stable point) [23] . We consider S storage devices threatened by an APT attacker (A) and defended by a cloud storage defender (D). The attacker (or defender) wishes to take control of the storage devices by launching attacks (or performs scan) during specific time intervals. However, the time period to finish an attack is not known in advance to any of the players. During the k th interactions between the attacker and the defender, we use y k i , x k i , and z k i as the time periods between two attacks, two scans, and the time to finish an attack on the i th storage device, respectively. It is clear that x k i > 0 because the defender needs time to scan the storage device for any possible APT attacks.
Let y k i and x k i be the strategy for the attacker and defender to maximize their payoff. However, the evolutionary stable strategy is stronger and more stable than NE, since it is stable against small deviations from the ESS. In this game, each player will resist the small perturbations, and stick to the same strategy. The payoff of the defender depends on the gain to a defender to scan the i th storage device denoted by G i . The cost for the attacker to launch APT on the i th storage device is denoted by C i . As shown in Figure 1 , the data stored on the i th storage device is safe with a probability min((y i +z i )/x i , 1), where the random variable z i is the time required to finish the APT attack on the i th device, which is usually not known in advance.
Similar to the assumption in [21] , z is quantized into L non zero levels with the distribution [P i l ] 0≤l≤L , where
The utility of the attacker denoted by u A (x, y) and the utility of the defender u D (x, y), are given by [21] as:
For the readers' convenience, we summarize our commonly used notations in Table 1 . 
IV. ESS OF THE DYNAMIC APT GAME
Each player aims to maximize his or her own utility optimization problem as follows:
The feasible action sets of the players in this game are predefined and known by both players. According to [21] , potential NEs of the APT defense game with one storage device are (0.5, 0), (1, 0), and (1, 1), which are the candidates of ESS. We fist consider the ESS of the APT detection game with one storage device. In this case, Eqs.(5) and (6)can be simplified into: where the strategies (x, y) are given by
T , and T denotes the transpose operation. In the mixed-strategy game, the attacker randomly chooses the strategy y with probability vector [δ i ] 1≤i≤3 , and the defender selects a strategy from x with probability vector [ρ i ] 1≤i≤2 . The payoff table for this game is given in Table 2 , where a(i, j) means the payoff of an attacker plays strategy y i against a defender plays strategy x j . Similarly, d(i, j) means the payoff of a defender plays strategy x j against an attacker plays strategy y i . According to [6] , there is no mixed ESS under the RD. The RD equation in its general form is given in (3). Let dρ i /dt =ρ i and dδ j /dt =δ j , and define the following dummy variables: α 1 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = a 11 ρ 1 + a 21 ρ 2 and α 2 (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = a 12 ρ 1 + a 22 ρ 2 . Then the RD equations are given by the following system of nonlinear differential equations:
whereρ i represents the evolution of the defender choice towards using the strategy x i , andδ j is the evolution of the APT-attacker choice towards using the strategy δ j . The ESS condition for the asymmetric game is given by Theorem 2 [6] . Note that we used 3 variables out of 5 variables, i.e, we used ρ 1 , δ 1 , and δ 2 , and removed ρ 2 and δ 3 . The reason is that they are dependent variables, so their time derivatives can be expressed in terms of the other variables as: ρ 2 = 1 − ρ 1 ⇒ρ 2 = −ρ 1 , and
For an equilibrium point to be asymptotically stable [24] , the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix should have negative real parts. Any point which is asymptotically stable will be an ESS candidate. As a result, the Jacobian matrix that is represented by (13) will be checked for the above pure strategies. Proof: The proof is divided into two parts, where in the first part we have to prove that the strategies mentioned in the claim above are asymptotically stable under some conditions. In the second part, we have to prove that the other strategies are not ESS candidates by proving them to be not asymptotically stable under any conditions. Testing for asymptotic stability is done by checking the negativity of eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix that corresponds to each one of these strategies. Some of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of these strategies will always have positive real part, which will exclude them from being asymptotically stable. Re-write equations (10) and (11) yielding,
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where,
The Jacobian matrix for the last RD system is given by (18) , as shown at the top of this page, 22 , and T 5 = a 11 − a 21 . For the sake of simplicity, we represent the pure strategies in terms of the mixed strategies as follows: (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ), where ρ i s are the defender probabilities of choosing pure strategies and δ j s are the attacker probabilities of choosing pure strategies, is written as (ρ 1 , δ 1 , δ 2 ).
We first check the asymptotic stability of (0,0,0), which corresponds to the pure strategy that the defender will choose to wait longer before scanning the device, and the attacker will do the same, i.e, choosing x 1 w.p ρ 1 = 0, x 2 w.p ρ 2 = 1, y 1 w.p δ 1 = 0, y 2 w.p δ 2 = 0, y 3 w.p δ 3 = 1.
The strategy is asymptotically stable if 0.5P 1 + P 0 < C and 0.5P 0 < C. For the defender D 3 < 0 as given by (15a), if the attacker is using the strategy y 3 , then the defender can gain more by using the strategy x 2 rather than the strategy x 1 .
On the other hand, the attacker needs to have a 21 < −1 and a 22 < −1, meaning that choosing the shorter waiting times y 1 = 0 and y 2 = 0.5 against a defender uses her longer waiting time strategy, x 2 , will give the attacker lower rewards than when using her longest waiting time strategy y 3 . In terms of the the payoffs, a 21 and a 22 are giving less than a 23 . Similarly, we can prove the asymptotic stability of (0,1,0) and (1,1,0), which is equivalent to check stability of the scenario in which the defender chooses the longest waiting period before scanning a device, and the attacker starts attacking without waiting, and the scenario in which the defender chooses the shorter waiting period to scan the device and an attacker continuously keeps attacking.
A. CHECKING (0,0,1) FOR ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY
This is equivalent to check the pure strategy where the defender chooses the longer waiting period, x 2 = 1, and the attacker uses the shorter waiting period, y 2 = 0.5, i.e, choosing x 2 w.p 1, and y 2 w.p 1. The eigenvalues are D 2 + D 3 , a 21 − a 22 , and −(a 22 + 1). However, to make the condition a 21 − a 22 < 0 means we need P 1 + P 0 < 0, which does not hold. As a result this strategy is not asymptotically stable. Similarly, we can prove that (1,0,0) and (1,0,1) are not asymptotically stable.
Based on Claim 1, we can see that we are left with (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 1, 0) as potential ESS strategies. Next, the ESS test given in Theorem 2 will be applied to each asymptotically stable point. In the next section, we will take a numerical example and show how the simulation results agree with the derivations shown above. A general procedure for finding the ESS of any evolutionary game with more than two strategies is shown in the figure below:
In this example, an attacker and a defender compete to take control over a cloud storage device. The game is given by (7). For G = 0.9, C = 0.5, P 0 = 0.2, and P 1 = 0.5, the payoff matrices, and the replicator dynamics equations are given by: The eigenvalues for each pure strategy were found, using the procedure in Figure 2 , in order to validate our theoretical analysis. The Jacobian will be with respect to ρ 1 , δ 1 , and δ 2 . The eigenvalues are given in Table 3 .
One can see that (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (1, 0, 1) have positive eigenvalues as predicted by Claim 1. Next, the (0, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 0) strategies are eliminated too, because the asymptotic stability conditions for them do not hold, i.e, there are some eigenvalues that have nonnegative real parts. Finally, we are left with (0, 0, 0) (which is (0, 1) for the defender and (0, 0, 1) for the attacker) strategy as an asymptotically stable point, and hence a NE. We need to check if it is an ESS too. We apply Theorem 2 to it as follows: (21) . After simplifications, we get 0.3x 1 y 1 + (0.05y 3 + 0.4y 2 )x 2 > 0 for any nonzero y j s, j = 1, 2, 3 and x i , i = 1, 2. Finding the regions where these inequalities hold is a problem that is known in nonlinear control literature [24] as the problem of finding the region of attraction. However, we will not discuss it here and will use the phase portrait to get a pictorial representation of these regions. The simulation results are shown in Figure 3 , which shows clearly the concept of regions of attraction. Note that we used the pure strategies instead of the mixed strategies, which are used in Theorem 2. Figure 4 shows the strategies evolution from some initial conditions and the payoff associated with each strategy. Clearly, the payoff associated with the ESS strategy, which is in this case the defender chooses the shorter waiting period, x 2 = 0.5, w.p 1, and the attacker chooses the longest waiting period, y 3 = 1, w.p 1, is the highest payoff among all the other strategies for both players. The following claims provide more insight depending on the values of the defending gain and the attacking cost.
Claim 2: If C > 0.5P 1 + P 0 and G < P 1 , the APT defense game has one ESS candidate, which is the strategy (0, 1, 0, 0, 1).
Proof: If C > 0.5P 1 + P 0 , the conditions for asymptotic stability of (0, 1, 1, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 1, 0, 0) will not hold. In other words, the Jacobian matrix of these strategies will have eigenvalues with positive real parts, which means that they are not asymptotically stable. As a result, the only asymptotically stable strategy will be (0, 1, 0, 0, 1). The last strategy will be the only ESS candidate for the game.
2) NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 2
The following example is to validate Claim 2. We assume the following parameters: G = 0.1, C = 1.5, P 0 = 0.2, and P 1 = 0.5. The cost of launching the attack is much higher than the defense gain. Initial values that represent the players' initial mixed strategies or weighted decisions of how to choose their pure strategies are: ρ 1 (0) = 0.75, ρ 1 (0) = 0.25, δ 1 (0) = 0.1, δ 2 (0) = 0.4, and δ 3 (0) = 0.5. From the stability analysis, we get the eigenvalues in Table 4 , where the rest of the strategies are eliminated based on Claim 1. Figure 5 illustrates the probability evolution for selecting the pure strategies and the payoff for each strategy. It can be seen that the asymptotically stable strategies have the highest payoffs for both players. The phase portrait for this example is given by Figure 6 .
Claim 3: If the defending gain is G > P 1 and the attacking cost is C < 0.5P 0 , then the game has one ESS candidate. The attacker will continuously keep attacking the device and the defender will choose the longest waiting period to scan the device, i.e, (0, 1, 1, 0, 0) . 
Proof:
The proof follows from Claim 1, where we have three possible asymptotically stable points. If G > P 1 and C < 0.5P 0 , the conditions for asymptotic stability for (1, 0, 1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0, 0, 1) do not hold, because the Jacobian matrix for these strategies will have eigenvalues with positive real part which makes them unstable. On the other hand, the only asymptotically stable point is (0, 1, 1, 0, 0).
3) NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 3
The following example is to validate Claim 3. We take the following parameters: G = 1.5, C = 0.1, P 0 = 0. The probability evolutions of the game show that the asymptotically stable strategies have the highest payoffs for both players (see Figure 7) . The phase portrait as shown in Figure 8 indicates that the (0, 1, 0) is the only asymptotically stable strategy. The eigenvalues are shown in Table 5 . Now we consider the ESS of the APT defense game with multiple storage devices, which are S storage devices or data centers that are threatened by an APT attacker, whose , where δ i is the probability for the attacker to choose y i , and ρ i is the probability for the defender to choose x i . The cost vector for attacks denoted by C is given by [C i ] 1≤i≤S , and the defense vector gain G is given by [G i ] 1≤i≤S . The utilities for the strategies are given in Table 6 according to u H (x i , y j ) = S s=1 u s H (x i , y j ), where H = {D, A} and u s H (x i , y j ) is the utility function of player H for defending (attacking) the s th storage device.
4) REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
The ESS of the asymmetric APT defense game with two strategies can be derived via the procedure as shown in Figure 2 . According to [4, Theorem 9.8] , any asymptotically stable strategy is equivalent to an ESS. Let ρ 1 = ρ, ρ 2 = 1 − ρ, δ 1 = δ, and δ 2 = 1 − δ, we get the following system of nonlinear differential equations,
Notice thatρ 2 = −ρ orδ 2 = −δ. Letd ij = u D (x i , y j ), and a ij = u A (x i , y j ). After simplification, we havė
The Jacobian matrix of the dynamic game is given by
The ESS(s), if any, are the pure strategies that are asymptotically stable. Asymptotic stability of the pure strategies corresponds to the strategies which give stable eigenvalues to the Jacobian matrix given in (30). Without loss of generality, we now focus on the case of two storage devices (S=2) and discuss the specifics of the ESS and asymptotically stable NE obtained for this case. Each player has two strategies to choose from, i.e, each player divides the waiting time to scan (attack) between the two devices. The available strategies for the players are: x 1 = (0.75, 0.25), meaning that the defender will wait 0.75 time units before scanning the first device and 0.25 time units before scanning the second device, and x 2 = (0.5, 0.5) for the defender. Similarly, the attacker strategies are y 1 = (1, 0) and y 2 = (0.5, 0.5). The strategies are chosen as, y 1 w.p δ 1 , y 2 w.p δ 2 , x 1 w.p ρ 1 , and x 2 w.p ρ 2 . u H (x = x i , y = y j ) = u 1 H (x = x i , y = y j ) + u 2 H (x = x i , y = y j ), where H = {D, A}, and u 1 H (x = x i , y = y j ) is the utility function for defending (attacking) the first storage device. Similarly, u 2 H (x = x i , y = y j ) is the utility function for defending (attacking) the second storage device.
Based on the stability of the rest points of the RD system in (25) and (26) Proof: This claim has two parts. First, we prove that the other game pure strategies can be asymptotically stable under some conditions. This will be shown through asymptotic stability. Second, we prove that this strategy is not asymptotically stable. We start by proving that there are ESS candidates under some conditions.
a: CHECKING (0,0) FOR ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY
This is equivalent to checking the pure strategy (x 2 , y 2 ) for being asymptotically stable.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (31) areD 2 andD 4 . By Eq.s (29b and 29d), this strategy is locally asymptotically stable if G 1 + G 2 > 2.68P 0 and P 0 < C 2 . Furthermore, the eigenvalueD 2 which is given by (29b) has to be negative, indicating thatd 22 >d 12 which holds as long as 0.25G 1 + 0.5G 2 < P 0 holds. For the attacker, the eigenvalueD 4 , wherê D 4 is given by (29d), has to be negative. This means that a 21 <â 22 or the payoff for the attacker uses the strategy y 2 , is higher than using the strategy y 1 against a defender using the strategy x 2 . This holds by setting P 0 < C 2 , which is the second condition. Similarly, we can prove that (1, 0), (1, 1) , and (0, 1) are not asymptotically stable as well. As a result, this strategy cannot be locally asymptotically stable.
3, and C 2 = 0.5. It is clear that the conditions to get negative eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (31) hold and thus the strategy (0, 0) (i.e., ρ 1 = 0, ρ 2 = 1, δ 1 = 0, and δ 2 = 1) is locally asymptotically stable in the game with two storage devices. Figure 9 presents the evolution of the probabilities for selecting the pure strategies for a specific set of initial conditions accompanied with the utility of each player at each of these strategies, showing that the ESS strategy gives both player the highest payoff. Figure 10 shows that for all the initial conditions, the game will evolve to (0, 0).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the APT attack/defense strategies for cloud storage using evolutionary game theory, and we formulated two APT games with discrete strategies. The first game corresponds to the APT defense of a single one storage device regarding the attack and defense time periods. The second game extends the discussion to multiple storage devices. The dynamical stability of the cloud storage systems were investigated using the replicator dynamics criteria to characterize the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium strategies. The ESS of the APT defense game is derived and the conditions under which each ESS exists are provided to show how the initial scan and attack intervals, the APT attack duration and cost, and the defense cost change the APT defense performance. We have provided the phase portraits to show the locally asymptotically stable points of each game, which represent the NE of the game, and show the relation between the asymptotic stability and evolutionary stability. 
